1	OVERTURE 1 from Piedmont Triad Presbytery (to CCB, OC)
1 2	"Amend BCO 35-1 and 35-8 Regarding Witness Eligibility"
3	
4 5	Be it resolved : That <i>BCO</i> 35-1 and 35-8 be amended by deleting some current language (indicated below by strikethrough) and adding some new language (indicated below by
6	underlining).
7	
8	35-1. All persons of proper age and intelligence are competent witnesses, except
9	such as do not believe in the existence of God, or a future state of rewards and
10	punishments. Any person who promises to testify truthfully (BCO 35-8) can be
11	called as a witness. Either party has the right to challenge object to a witness
12	whom he believes to be incompetent, and the court shall consider and rule on the
13	objection examine and decide upon his competency.
14	N 1 PCO 25 2 d 1 25 7
15	No changes to BCO 35-2 through 35-7
16	25 0 771 41 00° 41 4 14 14 14 14 14 14
17	35-8. The oath or affirmation to a witness shall then be administered by the
18	Moderator in the following or like terms: The court shall inform the witness that,
19	regardless of whether he believes in God or in a future state of rewards and
20	punishments, his promise is made in the presence of God and God will judge him
21	on the truthfulness of his answers. The Moderator shall then ask the witness the
22	<u>following:</u>
23	D 1 1
24	Do you solemnly promise, in the presence of God, that you will declare
25	the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, according to the
26	best of your knowledge in the matter in which you are called to witness,
27	as you shall answer it to the great Judge of the living and the dead?
28	If 1
29	If, however, at any time a witness should present himself before a court, who for
30	conscientious reasons prefers to swear or affirm in any other manner, he should be allowed to do so.
31	DE allowed to do so.
32	Small that the final tent made.
33	Such that the final text reads:
34	35-1. Any person who promises to testify truthfully (BCO 35-8) can be called as
35	a witness. Either party has the right to object to a witness, and the court shall
36	consider and rule on the objection.
37	consider and rule on the objection.
38	25.9. The court shall inform the witness that recordless of whether he helioves
39	35-8. The court shall inform the witness that, regardless of whether he believes in God or in a future state of rewards and punishments, his promise is made in
40	the presence of God and God will judge him on the truthfulness of his answers.
41	The Moderator shall then ask the witness the following:
42	The Moderator shall their ask the withess the following.
43	Do you solemnly promise that you will declare the truth, the whole
44 45	truth, and nothing but the truth, according to the best of your
46	knowledge in the matter in which you are called to witness?
47	knowledge in the matter in which you are called to withess:
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Proposed Text of *BCO* 35-1 through 35-8

For context and clarity, the following is the full proposed text of *BCO* 35-1 through 35-8. Note that this text includes the two changes to *BCO* 35 approved and enacted by the 50th General Assembly.

35-1. (*If revised*) Any person who promises to testify truthfully (*BCO* 35-8) can be called as a witness. Either party has the right to object to a witness, and the court shall consider and rule on the objection.

35-2. (No change) The accused party is allowed, but shall not be compelled, to testify; but the accuser shall be required to testify, on the demand of the accused. A husband or wife shall not be compelled to bear testimony against one another in any court.

35-3. (*No change*) A court may, at the request of either party, or at its own initiative, make reasonable accommodation to prevent in-person contact with the accused:

a. The court may have testimony taken by videoconference. The videoconference shall employ technical means that ensure that all persons participating in the meeting can see and hear each other at the same time, and which allows for live cross-examination by both parties.

b. The court may restrict the accused from appearing on the videoconference screen, and when the accused is represented by counsel (*BCO* 32-19), cross-examination shall be conducted by that counsel.

c. In all cases where such accommodation has been made, videoconference testimony by witnesses under the age of 18 shall be taken by written interrogatory to be read to the witness by a person appointed by the court in accordance with the applicable provisions of *BCO* 35-11.

d. The court shall include in the record of the proceedings its reasons for this accommodation and any objection from either party.

35-4. (*No change*) The testimony of more than one witness shall be necessary in order to establish any charge; yet, if in addition to the testimony of one witness, corroborative evidence be produced, the offense may be considered proved.

35-5. (No change) It belongs to the court to judge the degree of credibility to be attached to all evidence.

35-6. (*No change*) No witness afterwards to be examined, unless a member of the court, shall be present during the examination of another witness on the same case, if either party object.

35-7. (No change) Witnesses shall be examined first by the party introducing them; then cross-examined by the opposite party; after which a member of the court, or either party, may put additional interrogatories. No question shall be put or

answered except by permission of the moderator, subject to an appeal to the court. The court shall not permit questions frivolous or irrelevant to the charge at issue.

35-8. *(If revised)* The court shall inform the witness that, regardless of whether he believes in God or in a future state of rewards and punishments, his promise is made in the presence of God and God will judge him on the truthfulness of his answers. The Moderator shall then ask the witness the following:

Do you solemnly promise that you will declare the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, according to the best of your knowledge in the matter in which you are called to witness?

Rationale

This Overture proposes to amend Chapter 35 of the *Book of Church Order* by revising the criteria for witness eligibility to allow persons professing no supernatural belief as witnesses in cases of process. Currently, *BCO* 35-1 disqualifies as witnesses persons "who do not believe in the existence of God, or a future state of rewards and punishments." The proposed amendments would expand witness eligibility such that persons who do not believe in God or a future state of rewards and punishments are permitted to act as witnesses in cases of process and to offer their testimony to the courts of the church. The Overture also revises the instructions of *BCO* 35-8 regarding the promise witnesses shall make.

Summary of what the proposed amendment does, and does not, do.

1. The amendment expands witness eligibility and permits church courts to hear the testimony of persons who are willing to affirm the revised question in *BCO* 35-8.

2. The amendment retains a party's right to object to the admittance of any witness.

3. The amendment requires the court to inform every witness, regardless of his individual beliefs, that his oath or affirmation is made in the presence of God and that God will judge him on the truthfulness of his answers.

4. The amendment modifies the exemplary promise such that it is more generally applicable to Christians, non-Christian theists, and atheists.

 5. The amendment *does not* require the court to permit any person to testify as a witness. Only witnesses who affirm that they will testify truthfully are permitted to be considered as witnesses. If either party objects to the admittance of a witness, the court shall consider and rule on the objection.

6. The amendment *does not* require the court to attach the same degree of credibility to the testimony of every witness (cf. *BCO* 31-8; 35-5).

 7. The amendment *does not* require the court to administer an oath to any witness for whom an oath to God would be unlawful (cf. WCF 22.2).

Further Explanation and Responses to Objections

The current restriction of *BCO* 35-1 is properly understood as a product of the context of Christendom that dominated for centuries in the West. There was an extended time in the West when belief in God generally and belief in the Christian faith particularly were so widespread that even those outside of the church could be presumed to be theists of some sort, and the absence of such belief in an individual signaled an unusually significant philosophical and moral deviation from societal norms. In this context of common theistic belief, restrictions against non-theist witnesses did not severely curtail the church's capacity to receive the judicial testimony of outsiders in her courts. This is no longer the case in the rapidly secularizing modern world. In our current post-Christendom cultural milieu, functional naturalism is no longer an exceptional anomaly, and those outside of the church who might possess valuable testimony for her courts are increasingly likely to formally profess no belief in God or a future state of rewards and punishments. The proposed amendment revises witness eligibility requirements in recognition of the sweeping and profound cultural shifts that have taken place in recent decades in order that our courts are not unduly restrained in their pursuit of truth and justice.

The Westminster Standards make abundantly clear that there are many ways that falsehood may corrupt the life, witness, integrity, and justice of Christ's church. Of course, overt lies may come in from the outside. But falsehood may also take root if, internally, the church sets up obstacles to her unfettered pursuit of the truth. Westminster Larger Catechism 144–145 state that, beyond merely avoiding bearing false testimony, the ninth commandment enjoins Christians actively to "the preserving and promoting of truth" and that it prohibits "concealing the truth, undue silence in a just cause, and holding our peace when iniquity calleth for either a reproof from ourselves, or complaint to others" or otherwise acting "to the prejudice of truth or justice." What is more, the command calls us to "a charitable esteem of our neighbors," including our atheist neighbors, which at very least means that we ought to charitably entertain the possibility that our neighbors who bear the image of God are by common grace capable of telling the truth about grave matters. The notion that non-theists, in the absence of the threat of immediate punishment, ought never to be trusted to offer truthful testimony posits a perpetual hermeneutic of suspicion that fails both to conform to the Reformed doctrine of common grace and to attain the heights of the "charitable esteem" required by the Decalogue and our Standards.

The law of God binds not only the life of Christians individually but the life of the church collectively and the conduct of her courts. Insofar as a provision of our *BCO* inhibits the courts' preservation and promotion of truth in a manner that may functionally result in the concealment of the truth and undue silence to the prejudice of justice, said provision impedes the church in its God-mandated commitment to the truth. Fully and joyfully giving ourselves to the vision of the ninth commandment laid out in our Standards will involve the careful,

 circumspect work of removing unnecessary hindrances that obstruct the courts of the church in their labors to pursue, establish, expose, and respond with justice to the truth wherever it may be found.

Significantly, the proposed amendment does not mandate that a court receive as equally credible every witness' testimony. It simply permits witnesses who profess no faith to offer their testimony to be judged by the wisdom and discretion of the court (cf. BCO 35-5), even as it retains the right of either party to object to the participation of any witness. This provision will be incalculably valuable in the abundant and easily imagined scenarios wherein an individual who does not believe in God or a future state of rewards and punishments may be able to offer substantive testimony about the speech, actions, or abusive behavior of a member of the church. Whether an unbelieving neighbor who witnesses sinful conduct while attending a dinner in a member's home, or an adult child living at home who sees one spouse strike another, or an atheist coworker who individually observes unethical acts or an adulterous relationship in the workplace, or a medical professional who treats an injury and can corroborate a victim's disclosure to the court, or a secularist visiting a church who alone witnesses (or even suffers) the commitment of an offense, or a victim of abuse within the church who has been so harmed as to have left the faith but nevertheless desires to bear witness to the court and seek the justice deserved, all of these individuals and so many more may be gifts to the church's courts as those courts seek to do what is right before God for the sake of Christ's bride and in the cause of truth and justice.

What is more, the requirement of *BCO* 8-2 (echoing 1 Timothy 3:7) that every elder "should have a good report of them that are outside the Church" suggests that the courts of the church ought to have a constitutional means of formally receiving and substantiating by way of judicial testimony an ill report from those outside the church—atheists among them—that would call into question an ordained elder's continued qualification and fitness for office, questions that would necessarily be settled through judicial process. As the *BCO* currently stands, any offense witnessed and corroborable exclusively by individuals who do not believe in God or a state of future rewards and punishments, whether committed by an elder or any other member of the church, is rendered functionally invisible to the courts of the church because there is no avenue for such witnesses to offer admissible testimony to the offense. Such offenses are not invisible to the Lord of the church, and they should not be invisible to the church of the Lord.

 Outright lies are not the only threat to the justice of the church's courts. Constitutional obstacles to the open pursuit of the truth, wherever it may be found, are perhaps a more sinister—because a more subtle—way that falsehood may prevail and injustice multiply to the harm of the most vulnerable under our care.

Of course, witnesses are not called upon in judicial proceedings only to testify to an offense. They may also offer exculpatory testimony about an accused individual's innocence. It should be noted, then, that permitting non-theists to offer testimony in the courts of the church may serve the cause of truth and justice both by corroborating the wrongdoing of an offender and by substantiating the innocence of the wrongfully accused.

By way of comparison with a sister NAPARC denomination, the Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church already permits all persons created in the image of God to stand as witnesses: "All persons generally are competent to testify as witnesses, though the court shall make due allowance for age, intelligence, character, belief in God, possible bias, relationship to the parties involved, and other like circumstances" (*Book of Discipline*, 4.4J). Consequently, the ARP is currently better equipped than the PCA to welcome the truth into her courts, protect the vulnerable, guard the purity of the church, and adjudicate with justice.

The formation of the Ad Interim Committee on Domestic Abuse and Sexual Assault by the 47th General Assembly and the reception of their report at the 49th General Assembly indicated an initial commitment by the Presbyterian Church in America to take constructive action toward reviewing policies and procedures and implementing wise changes to the *BCO* in order to more effectively protect the vulnerable, respond to allegations of abuse, find the truth, acquit the innocent, and create judicial processes whereby victims are not unduly burdened and are instead able to pursue and receive just recourse from the church. This amendment represents one step toward making good on that commitment. While the proposed changes to Chapter 35 of the *BCO* are relevant to all manner of judicial proceedings, they are particularly crucial to ongoing endeavors to better protect children and victims of abuse.

In Holy Scripture, the certainty and efficacy of God's justice are not contingent upon the internal faith or fear of any individual. The apostle Paul declares that Christ Jesus is he "who is to judge the living and the dead" (2 Timothy 4:1), the Lord who can be trusted to render justice according to deeds (2 Timothy 4:14). In line with Scripture's unequivocal teaching that all persons without exception will be accountable to the justice of God, the proposed revision to BCO 35-8 requires the court to inform all witnesses that their testimony is given in the presence of God and that God will judge them on the truthfulness of their answers. Consequently, the members of the court may take heart in their declaration precisely because God truly is the God who is—the Judge of the living and of the dead—irrespective of any potential witness' belief or non-belief. When invoking the justice of God, the most basic question is not, "Does this witness believe in the God of justice?" but rather, "Do we believe in the God of justice?"

Notably, the proposed amendment to *BCO* 35-8 does not require atheists to swear an unlawful oath (cf. *WCF* 22.2) by the name of a God in whom they do not believe. The court's declaration to the witness regarding God's presence and judgment is true regardless of the witness' subjective belief, and the language of the amended promise is applicable without issue to Christian, non-Christian, theist, and non-theist witnesses alike. Intriguingly, while non-Christian theists are currently permitted to testify in the courts of the church—and, presumably, to swear the included oath in its present language by God's name—the amended promise removes the possibility that a non-Christian theist might be asked to swear an oath by God's name and, in this way, is more consistent with the claims of *WCF* 22.2 that oaths by God's name require "holy fear and reverence" and must not be sworn "vainly and rashly."

To the potential objection that the courts of the church ought to have jurisdiction over and authority to discipline all witnesses who testify, it should be noted that BCO 35-1 already

permits any non-Christian theist—who is not subject to the court's jurisdiction or authority to discipline—to testify as a witness. As currently written, *BCO* 35-1 does not require potential witnesses to be under the court's jurisdiction, and it is the objection and not the proposed amendment that is foreign to the PCA's existing policy in this regard.

To the potential objection that admitting atheists as witnesses renders the church liable to malicious lies, it should be noted that she already is and will continue to be until Christ returns. It is not immediately clear why this concern should be selectively applied to the atheist eager adherents of other non-Christian religions could presumably have as much or more reason to desire to intentionally harm the church with lies, but there exists no blanket prohibition in the BCO barring them from offering testimony. What is more, an atheist willing to lie in order to intentionally and maliciously bring harm to the church will presumably have no ethical qualms about lying concerning his belief in the supernatural in order that he be permitted to testify as a witness in the first place. Consequently, the current provisions of BCO 35 functionally do nothing to protect the church from an individual committed to spreading lies about and within the church. Ironically, the provisions as presently constructed serve only to prohibit the testimony of an honest atheist who forthrightly acknowledges his non-belief and yet wishes to bear truthful witness to the court, even as they are impotent against the dishonest atheist who is willing to lie about his beliefs in order to be admitted as a witness. The proposed amendment, however, removes the obstacle barring the honest atheist from testifying and, rather than relying on ineffective safeguards against malicious liars, focuses attention on the court's responsibility to judge the degree of credibility to be attached to the testimony of theist and non-theist witnesses alike.

 To the potential objection that atheist testimony is unnecessary because documentary evidence is admissible and sufficient, it should be noted that there are myriad offenses which are the interest of ecclesial courts that will never generate associated documentary evidence from authorities. Though forensic tests and evidence may at times be available to substantiate allegations of physical or sexual assault, other forms of abuse (e.g., emotional abuse, verbal abuse, spiritual abuse, and instances of physical and sexual abuse that do not leave physical evidence) and other forms of sin more generally (e.g., adultery, alcoholism, lying) are not analogously confirmable by testing and documentation and may in many cases only be substantiated through eyewitness testimony. Documentary evidence is in reality only available in a small fraction of cases relevant to the courts of the church. Even where documentary evidence is available, documents—unlike human witnesses—cannot answer the questions posed to them by various parties seeking clarification, disputing facts, or pursuing further related information in a judicial process. The courts' ability to hear all relevant witness testimony is therefore immensely important to their pursuit of truth and justice both when documentary evidence may be available and in the far more frequent scenarios when it is not.

To the potential objection that the civil magistrate, not the church courts, ought to be entrusted to handle the matters impacted by the amendment, it should be noted that most sinful offenses initiating process in ecclesial courts, including some forms of abusive behavior, are non-criminal in nature and therefore are not even subject to the involvement of the civil magistrate. To be clear, there are indeed certain types of accusation and offense that the civil magistrate

ought to initially address and investigate. In such cases, the church should do its best to continue to pastorally care for those involved, but the civil authorities should be promptly and clearly notified of potential crimes, especially if those crimes are against those more vulnerable. However, even in cases where an alleged offense is criminal in nature, it is certainly within the realm of possibility that the civil magistrate could ignore, fail to properly investigate, taint, or tamper with evidence relevant to, reach a wrong conclusion about, or otherwise mishandle an allegation. To reject necessary changes in our *BCO* on the grounds that the civil magistrate will handle the cases that fall through the cracks in our current provision involves a failure to reckon with the variety of offenses of interest to ecclesial courts and unduly binds the courts of the church to the actions and findings of an immanently fallible civil magistrate.

- Adopted by Piedmont Triad Presbytery at its stated meeting, August 12, 2023
- 14 Attested by /s/ TE Ethan Smith, stated clerk